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Risk Title 
The Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies is identified by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Research Program (HRP) as a 
recognized risk to human health and performance in space. The HRP Program Requirements 
Document (PRD) defines these risks. This Evidence Report provides a summary of the evidence 
that has been used to identify and characterize this risk. 
Risk Statement 
Given that training content, timing, intervals, and delivery methods must support crew task 
performance, and given that training paradigms will be different for long-duration missions with 
increased crew autonomy, there is a risk that operators will lack the skills or knowledge 
necessary to complete critical tasks, resulting in flight and ground crew errors and inefficiencies, 
failed mission and program objectives, and an increase in crew injuries. 
Risk Overview 
Human error has been implicated as a causal factor in nearly two thirds of mishaps across NASA 
(Chandler, 2007), and similar situations exist in related domains like commercial and military 
aviation (70-80% of incidents and accidents involve human error directly, and 100% of accidents 
and incidents involve human limitations in some way, see, e.g., Maurino, Reason, Johnson, & 
Lee, 1995). In a significant proportion of incidents involving human error, incorrect procedure 
execution played a role. 
Procedure execution errors (both of omission and commission) result from some combination of: 
inadequately designed tasks; inadequately designed procedures or tools; incomplete, inaccurate, 
or difficult-to-use documentation; fatigue, stress, injury, or illness; insufficient training 
(including lack of training for unanticipated operations); degradation of trained skills or 
knowledge; or inadequate understanding of the operational environment. 
Historically, spaceflight operations have mitigated some of these effects in at least two ways: 
specially-trained crewmembers are assigned to missions and/or rotated into the operational 
environment when complex, mission-critical tasks must be performed; and, execution of such 
procedures is closely monitored and supported by flight controllers on the ground who have 
access to a broader and deeper pool of information and expertise than any individual operator. 
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However, emerging mission architectures include long-duration operations in deep space. Such 
operations do not allow for assignment of new crewmembers or even for the development and 
validation of new training on the ground. Further, delays in communication will have a 
disruptive effect on the ability of earth-based flight controllers to monitor and support space 
operations in real time. As a result, it is necessary to develop an understanding of how training 
can be tailored to better support long-duration deep-space operations (including the extent to 
which materials, procedures, and schedules of training should be changed from current 
practices). Note, long-duration missions in low-earth orbit (LEO), such as operations on the 
International Space Station (ISS), and even lunar operations are of a different nature than deep-
space operations given the large difference in communication delays and the ability to return 
crewmembers to Earth within a very short time. 
The evidence presented in this chapter describes issues related to the risk of performance errors 
due to training deficiencies. Contributing factors regarding training deficiencies may pertain to 
organizational process and training programs for spaceflight, such as when training programs are 
inadequate or unavailable. Furthermore, matching between task and learning and memory 
abilities is a contributing factor. A mismatch can occur when the individual’s knowledge 
acquisition strategies and predispositions are inconsistent with mission demands. Learning, 
namely the relative efficiency with which an individual acquires new information and with 
which the relatively permanent adjustments in behavior or thinking are made, may not be 
consistent with mission demands. Thus, if training deficiencies are present, the likelihood of 
errors or of the inability to successfully complete a task increases. Importantly, there is an 
increase in the overall risk to the crew, the vehicle, and the mission. 
Risk is always a function of likelihood and consequences. Two important considerations in 
assessing the likelihood of the Training Risk are mission duration and the extent to which the 
crew must be autonomous (due to communications lag). The likelihood increases with mission 
duration due to increased intervals between training and operation where no refresher or just-in-
time training is in place; also, unexpected or emergent situations for which no applicable training 
exists are more likely in a long-duration mission. Likelihood also increases with higher levels of 
crew autonomy (due to less opportunity to obtain guidance/refresher training from ground 
support). When both of these factors are present (long-duration missions that require high crew 
autonomy), the likelihood of an adverse outcome is at its maximum. Accordingly, the Asteroid 
(Near Earth Asteroid (NEA)/Near Earth Object (NEO)) mission architecture (12+ month 
duration; up to 30 second communication delay) and the Mars mission architecture (3 year 
duration; up to 22 minute communication delay) are more likely to produce adverse outcomes. 
Lunar and ISS missions may have moderate to long-durations, but no appreciable 
communication delay; therefore, crew autonomy may not be as critical an issue.  
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On the consequence side of the risk function, for missions where communication with ground 
support is fast and reliable and where rotation of crew into operations is possible, training can be 
made more effective (in terms of length of time required for the acquisition of new knowledge 
and skills, durability of the of the acquired skills, and the ability to transfer learned knowledge 
and skills to new situations). Furthermore, it’s possible to compensate for inadequate training 
utilizing current training practices: Ground support personnel can monitor operations in real-time 
and offer guidance, instruction, or other information. Freshly-trained crew can be provided from 
the ground to execute sensitive and/or complex operations, and those operations can be executed 
in close temporal proximity to extensive ground-based training. However, when crews are 
remote from Earth and communication involves delays or is unreliable, those augmentations and 
mitigations to training are not possible. If inadequate crew training results in tasks being 
executed incompletely, incorrectly, or inefficiently, operations will be hindered. Only delayed 
ground support will be available to assist with development of workarounds or to provide 
guidance, instruction, or other information required to correctly complete a deferred task, by 
which time it might be too late. 
Long-duration deep-space missions also make the attenuation of adverse outcomes (particularly, 
re-supply or rescue operations) difficult or impossible, so the severity of outcomes may be 
greater for such operations. In general though, training-related errors are highly likely to cause 
time losses or inefficiencies and are less likely (but able) to cause serious damage to vehicles, 
habitats, or other equipment. In extreme cases (and, as is often the case, in combination with 
other factors), such errors could have significant impacts on mission objectives and crew safety. 
When other factors do not contribute to a situation to create high-severity consequences (e.g., a 
skipped step might have dire consequences in an emergency procedure where time is critical), 
most training inadequacies will lead to moderate impacts to operations (e.g., extended task times 
and the need for additional help from other crew or ground). Note that consequences become 
potentially far more serious in dynamic flight phases such as launch, docking, and landing, when 
there is very little time available to correct mistakes. It is also possible that a misstep during a 
medical operation would have personnel and health consequences; such consequences would be 
hard to predict. 
Levels of Evidence 
The levels of evidence presented in this chapter are based on the Levels of Evidence in the 
NASA Risk Management and Analysis Tool. These are: Case Study, Expert Opinion, Terrestrial 
Data, Expert Data, and Spaceflight Incidence. Evidence presented in this chapter encompasses 
lessons learned from 50 years of spaceflight experience and ground-based research related to the 
risks due to performance errors resulting from training deficiencies. Portions of the evidence 
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consist of summaries of subjective experience data, as well as non-experimental observations or 
comparative, correlation, and case or case-series studies. It should be noted that some evidence 
in this chapter is derived from the Flight Crew Integration (FCI) ISS Life Sciences Crew 
Comments Database. Although summaries of ISS crew feedback are presented as evidence, the 
database is protected and is not publicly available, due to the sensitive nature of the raw crew 
data it contains.  
Levels of Evidence may include, but are not limited to: 
x Case study  
x Expert data  
x Expert opinion 
x Spaceflight incident data 
x Terrestrial data  
x Modeling 
Evidence 
Training is the systematic acquisition of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. It is about providing 
those being trained with the right competencies necessary to successfully perform a specific job 
or task (Salas, Wilson, Priest, & Guthrie, 2006). When the right knowledge is not transferred 
during training, errors occur. 
As early as 1953, in the early days of human factors research, training had already been 
recognized as a critical issue. In his seminal work on human factors in air transportation, 
McFarland (1953) dedicates a whole chapter to training issues. He notes that “little attention has 
been given to the human factors involving an airman’s understanding of his environment and the 
physical factors influencing his efficiency” (p. 152). More recent works continue to echo the 
same concerns. Training deficiencies are clearly pointed out in the analysis of accidents and 
incidents in aviation (e.g., Barshi & Loukopoulos, 2012; Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 
2007; Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009a, 2009b), other modes of transportation 
(National Transportation Safety Board), and in other high-risk industries (e.g., Grote, 2009; 
Helmreich, & Merrit, 1998; Reason, 1997).  
Most accidents and incidents involve some loss of situation awareness (SA). Such loss of SA is 
often cited as causal in aviation accidents as well as in Mission Control Center errors. Analyses 
of general aviation accidents that have been caused by the pilot’s lack of SA cited inadequate 
general aviation training that did not effectively address how to improve SA. Analysis was 
conducted to determine the nature of the problems that occur in situations where SA was lost, as 
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well as the differences in SA between pilots who perform well and those who do not. The results 
yielded four key recommendations for how SA could be improved through training. The first 
recommendation is to provide training that will allow the pilots to develop good task-
management strategies to deal with interruptions, distractions, and overall workload that can 
pose a high threat to SA. The second recommendation is development of comprehension: 
providing pilots with the tools necessary to properly gauge the temporal aspects of the situation, 
the risk levels involved and personal and system capabilities for dealing with the situation. The 
third recommendation is to provide pilots with skills to project and plan, which will allow them 
to actively seek important information in advance of a known immediate need for it, and plan for 
contingencies. The final recommendation is to encourage information seeking and self-checking 
activities, i.e., skills that will help pilots notice trends and react to events more quickly. 
Development and implementation of training programs that focus on these four 
recommendations should effectively improve SA in pilots (Endsley & Garland, 2000).  
Another specific area in which training deficiencies have been identified in accident and incident 
analysis is team communication. It has been reported that deficient communication between the 
ground and crew can cause frustration and negatively affect performance. This can be due to 
ground operators having difficulty identifying information related to task duration, which in turn 
frustrates the crew and ground personnel because the perception of task duration is different 
between those developing timelines and those executing the task. Many times crewmembers 
have not been able to identify information regarding what the ground could assist with and what 
tasks could be automated to facilitate crew productivity (Rando, Baggerman, & Duvall, 2005). 
The most efficient and effective teams (e.g., aviation, military, design teams) manage to 
coordinate their activities with just enough, but not too much communication (Entin & Serfaty, 
1999; Orasanu & Fischer, 1992; Patrashkova-Volzdoska, McComb, Green, & Compton, 2003). 
Thus, proper training in communication is crucial, because a team is at risk in the absence of 
task-specific procedures and training for assuring appropriate communication, especially in the 
case of distributed teams in which shared context cannot carry some of the communication 
function. To overcome this risk, task procedures, training, and tools must be designed in such a 
way that essential information is communicated while keeping down the process cost, thereby 
minimizing the added workload required to communicate among team members.  
In a study by Schaafstal, Schraagen, and van Berlo (2000), Navy weapons engineers’ 
troubleshooting problems were attributed to: 
x Insufficient training, 
x Technical documentation written from an engineering viewpoint instead of a maintenance 
viewpoint, and 
x A gap between the theoretical knowledge and application of this knowledge in a real-life 
situation. That gap is a clear training deficiency. 
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Much of the research literature on training is motivated by current training practices aimed at 
current training needs. There is no experience with long-duration space missions where crews 
must practice semi-autonomous operations, where ground support must accommodate significant 
communication delays, and where so little is known about the environment. Thus, not only must 
we resolve known deficiencies in the current state-of-the-art in training, we must also develop 
robust methodologies and tools to prepare our crews for the unknown. The research necessary to 
support such an endeavor does not currently exist, but existing research does reveal general 
challenges that are relevant to long-duration, high-autonomy missions. 
For example, learning is highly specific to the conditions under which it occurred, especially 
when the learning involves procedural, as opposed to declarative, information. To account for 
this specificity, Healy and Bourne (1995a; see also Healy, 2007; Healy, Wohldmann, & Bourne, 
2005) proposed a procedural reinstatement principle, according to which training on one skill 
does not transfer to another related skill unless the procedures required by the two skills overlap. 
This principle is clearly related to other principles and theories in the literature, including: 
Thorndike’s (1906) theory of identical elements (see also Rickard & Bourne, 1995, 1996; 
Singley & Anderson, 1989); Tulving and Thomson’s (1973) encoding specificity principle; 
Morris, Bransford, and Franks’s (1977) transfer-appropriate processing principle (see also 
McDaniel, Friedman, & Bourne, 1978; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989); Proteau, Marteniuk, 
and Lévesque’s (1992) specificity of practice theory involving sensorimotor representations for 
motor learning; and Kolers and Roediger’s (1984) theory involving procedures of the mind. 
Performance also changes with level of stress on the trainee. At low levels of stress, performance 
might be poor, but as stress increases gradually, performance improves. At a certain point, stress 
level is optimal for performance on a given task. Beyond the optimum, additional stress might 
degrade performance, and when stress becomes extreme, the trainee might "choke" or panic 
(Staal, Bolton, Yaroush, & Bourne, 2008). However, stress has been shown to affect speed and 
accuracy of responses differently. For example, the stress that comes from fatigue developed as a 
result of continuous work on a task leads to faster but less accurate performance (a speed-
accuracy tradeoff; see Healy, Kole, Buck-Gengler, & Bourne, 2004). Similarly, Wolfe, 
Horowitz, Cade, and Czeisler (2000) found that sleep deprivation led to an increase in errors on a 
visual search task for a target among varying numbers of distractors as well as to a reduction in 
the slope of the function relating response time to the number of distractors (see also Horowitz, 
Cade, Wolfe, & Czeisler, 2003). Thus, sleepy observers responded quickly but carelessly. 
Consequently, adding stressors to a task could be harmful (e.g., in the case of accuracy) or 
beneficial (e.g., when speed is the primary requirement) depending on what aspects of the task 
are most crucial and on the ambient level of stress. Stress and sleep loss contributing factors are 
discussed in the evidence book for the HRP risk on sleep, thus is not addressed here. 
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Further, declines in performance are associated with increasing intervals between training and 
performance. Multiple causal factors contributed to Mir-Progress collision (Ellis, 2000). The 
Russian spacecraft Progress 234 collided with the Mir space station, causing the pressure hull to 
rupture, and nearly causing the Mir to be abandoned (Ellis, 2000; Shayler, 2000). One of the 
causal factors of this event resulting in a near-catastrophe was the training-performance interval. 
The crew last received formal training four months before the docking incident. Such skill 
degradation is likely to be exacerbated as mission duration increases, and crews place greater 
reliance on onboard automation. 
Performance declines, exhibited by increased response time (or decreased accuracy), have been 
known since the time of Ebbinghaus (1885/1913), who used a measure of savings (i.e., the 
amount of relearning required to achieve the criterion level of performance during original 
learning). Subsequently, this relationship between response time and retention interval was 
described as a power law (Wickelgren, 1974), R = d + fT-g, where R is response time, T is the 
retention interval, d is the criterion of original learning, f is a scaling parameter, and g is the rate 
of forgetting. This Power Law of Forgetting (Wixted & Carpenter, 2007; see also Rubin & 
Wenzel, 1996) can be thought of as the inverse of the Power Law of Practice (Newell & 
Rosenbloom, 1981), which describes the acquisition process for most skills (the relationship 
between trials of practice and time to make a correct response is a power function, R = aN-b, 
where R is response time on trial N, a is response time on trial 1, and b is the rate of change). 
The understanding of these relationships is crucial for the design of effective training. 
Current shuttle astronaut training is largely based on extended practice (e.g., 
http://www.spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/support/training/ascan/2004/index.html; personal 
communications). Shuttle mission success was partly due to a long lead-time (2-3 years) for 
training, short (1-2 weeks) and highly scripted Shuttle missions, and continuous communication 
with ground support. For ISS missions, most of the training is completed on the ground before 
the mission. Moreover, pre-launch training is mostly task-specific rehearsal, often distributed 
over time and place, which minimizes coherence and continuity.  
Concerns about training issues continue to be a common complaint in debriefings of crews 
returning from space missions. For example, interviews with crewmembers who have served as 
Crew Medical Officer (CMO) indicate that following initial training, there are no formal reviews 
of the entire course if/when they are assigned to another mission, and that there is no formal 
assessment of the effectiveness of current CMO training and onboard refresher training modules 
for long-term retention of space medical training. It’s possible that such deficiencies are the 
result of underestimating the importance of training due to the history of low frequency of 
medical events in space, and a certain comfort level due to ground medical expertise always 
being available when needed. However, that will not be the case with future, long-duration space 
missions. Similarly, minimal to no influence of current understanding of human learning, skill 
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acquisition and retention can be seen in recent “just-in-time” training for new experiments sent to 
ISS. For example, refresher training for the Dust and Aerosol Measurement Feasibility Test 
(DAFT) experiment was uplinked to ISS on February 3rd, 2005; it consisted of only three 
PowerPoint slides, each with a few bullet points, one slide with two pictures of relevant 
equipment, and one slide of the general process flow chart. Multiple challenges arose, leading to 
the premature termination of the protocol (see, e.g., Evans et al. 2009; Urban et al. 2005). Such 
training will not be adequate to support long-duration missions where many potential tasks 
cannot be predicted and trained in advance, and where ground support may not be immediately 
available. Furthermore, given the stress and problems associated with current training practices 
for the individual crewmembers and their families1; shorter, more efficient, and more effective 
training is needed to better support our crews. Research and development is required to 
maximize training coherence for effective retention and transfer. Furthermore, skill-based 
training must replace task-based rehearsal to support generalizability and the ability to deal with 
unexpected, untrained-for emerging tasks and opportunities. Crews must develop appropriate 
responses and procedures as situations demand, drawing upon more in-depth understanding of 
spacecraft systems and operations. More extensive cross training will also enhance situational 
resiliency. 
The Training Continuum 
Training can be seen as distributed along a continuum, from initial pre-mission training, through 
ground and in flight refreshers, to onboard initial training, to just-in-time training, and all the 
way to performance support tools. For optimal results, careful distribution of training topics and 
training methodologies is required across the full continuum of training opportunities. The 
relevant issues at each point along this continuum are different. For the initial, pre-mission 
training, key questions have to do with task-based training vs. skill-based training, with optimal 
use of simulation facilities and the methodology by which the right level of simulation fidelity 
can be selected given the operational context and the individual learner, as well as the right 
training methodology and delivery system (e.g., classroom vs. computer based training (CBT)). 
Onboard initial and refresher training will be significantly constrained by onboard delivery 
technologies, though virtual environments hold great promise. However, given the limited 
                                                     
 
 
1 The current training regime is very stressful for crewmembers and their families as it involves many 
years of intensive and intense work, frequent overseas travel, and long absences from home.  
Crewmembers often comment that the missions themselves are far easier on everybody than the years of 
training. 
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ground-based experience that has been gained thus far with such systems, key questions about 
training methodologies and delivery mechanisms remain, as well as about differences in 
acquisition and retention between on-ground and onboard training sessions. For refresher 
training in particular, questions about which topic should be refreshed and at what interval 
require a systematic methodology for determination. Just-in-time training requires the ability to 
expect the unexpected. That is, training can only be developed for expected tasks and situations. 
Just-in-time training will be needed for low likelihood events and situations that are not time 
critical. Because not all such events can be anticipated in advance, methods for the crew to 
develop their own training for such occasions must be developed for cases when communication 
delays prevent the up-link of such training from the ground. Somewhat similar issues exist for 
the development of performance support tools, either for situations that don’t justify training, or 
for when time is critical and the crew does not have the opportunity to receive training prior to 
operations. Again, determining which events can be handled using performance support tools 
and how such tools can best be designed requires systematic methodologies that do not yet exist. 
The risk of performance errors due to training deficiencies includes two primary contributing 
factors: 1) Organizational Training Issues/Programs; and 2) Matching Between Tasks and 
Learning and Memory Abilities. The contributing factors were derived from the Department of 
Defense (DoD) Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), the industry 
standard for human error categorization. (Department of Defense, 2005). The evidence about risk 
reduction presented in this report is organized around two types of causal risk factors, selected 
from the HFACS categories of error (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). This classification system 
attempts to identify the point or points in a causal chain of events that produced an accident, 
typically with behavior identified as an error after the fact. This approach focuses on explaining 
events after they happen, and providing a causal chain in this explanation. 
Contributing Factor 1: Organizational Training Issues/Programs  
Organizational training issues/programs is a factor when training programs are inadequate or 
unavailable. Training that aims at the acquisition of durable skills often leads to high specificity 
(see, e.g., Healy and Bourne, 1995; Vogel and Thompson, 1995). Thus, training for tasks that 
will be performed under extreme conditions and environments can be less than adequate for 
other mission objectives. This is due to the fact that simulated environments and ground-based 
full-scale models or mockups cannot be completely representative of flight conditions. 
Representing a true 0g environment on the ground has presented many challenges for training, so 
current simulations facilities and methods may not be adequate for preflight training. Figures 1 
and 2 depict training both in ground based mockups and trained operations being performed 
onboard the ISS. 
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Figure 1. JSC2007-E-46438 — Astronaut Peggy 
A. Whitson, Expedition 16 commander, and 
cosmonaut Yuri I. Malenchenko, flight engineer 
representing the Russian Federal Space Agency, 
participate in a ground based training session with 
the onboard communication system in a Russian 
module mockup at the Gagarin Cosmonaut 
Training Center, Star City, Russia (NASA Human 
Spaceflight Gallery, 2008).  
 
Figure 2. ISS016-E-022130 — Cosmonaut Yuri I. 
Malenchenko, Expedition 16 flight engineer 
representing the Russian Federal Space Agency, 
performs previously trained, real time operations 
onboard ISS with the onboard communication 
system while working in the Russian Zvezda 
service module of the ISS (NASA Human 
Spaceflight Gallery, 2008). 
Stowage problems on ISS are one example of 1-G training failing to build adequate skills needed 
for task execution in 0-G. As documented in the FCI ISS Life Sciences Crew Comments 
Database, a true representation of the stowage of equipment and materials onboard the ISS is 
very difficult to achieve on the ground and can create issues for the crew. Stowage mockups in 
1g are limited because gravity restricts operations, translation, and stowage placement in the 
training facilities. Given the constraints of a 1G-based translation path, it is not possible or safe 
to place things where they would potentially be stowed onboard the ISS. On-orbit there is the 
benefit of weightlessness, which allows stowage of items on any axis with proper restraint. The 
crew can translate through the available volume and position their bodies to move around 
obstructions or protrusions in the translation paths. Additionally, while on-orbit, some of the 
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stowage lockers are packed tightly, making it difficult to re-stow items due to the lack of gravity 
working against the crewmember. Similarly, crews often have trouble with items floating off 
during retrieval or re-stow. In a 1G environment, stowage does not behave the same as in a 0G 
environment. However, tasks and procedures are written based on what is known from testing in 
a 1G environment, and so is the training; unfortunately, a mock-up may not be the best 
representation of what it will be like for the crewmembers while on-orbit. Given the gravitational 
differences between Earth and orbit, and disconnects between ground training and actual life on-
orbit, the crewmembers have a lot to learn once onboard the ISS. The result is that, upon arrival 
on ISS, the crew often has difficulty managing stowage and operating nominally, leading to loss 
of precious time, inefficiencies, and crew frustration. 
Long periods of disuse lead to skill decay (see, e.g., Winfred, et al. 1998). The passage of time 
and the lack of opportunity to rehearse or refresh acquired knowledge or skills will result in 
performance decrements due to forgetting what was learned. Training programs that do not 
account for degradation of learned skills or knowledge (e.g., by including refresher training or by 
providing just-in-time training rather than advanced training on the ground) may result in inferior 
task performance. In addition, fragile memory structures crumble under stress and fatigue (see, 
e.g., Staal, 2004). Thus, training for long-duration missions must be robust, and must support 
extensive memory structures that can withstand the effects of fatigue and stress likely to be 
experienced during such missions. Because rote learning leads to fragile memory structures, 
training for long-duration missions will have to take a different approach. Thus, onboard 
refresher training as well as just-in-time training and performance support tools must be 
developed to support long-duration missions. Research must be conducted to determine the 
sensitivity of different skills to disuse, and the refresher schedule required. Furthermore, to 
support long-duration missions we must develop an understanding of the kinds of tasks that must 
be trained in advance, those that can be trained enroute, and those that can be trained just-in-time 
or even supported while being performed without prior training. 
More generally, whether or not the correct training methods, materials, and platforms are 
available, qualified instructors and valid evaluation methods are also needed to ensure adequate 
training. Given that methods, materials, and platforms are still in development for long-duration 
mission concepts, it may be problematic to find or train instructors in order to promptly and 
properly support training programs for such future missions. However, the benefits of developing 
and validating systematic approaches to training skills and transfer of skill between situations far 
outweigh the potential costs and consequences of not being able to perform tasks on missions 
with high crew autonomy. Furthermore, developing guidelines for adequate distribution of 
training topics across the full continuum of training opportunities (from initial pre-mission 
training, through ground and in flight refreshers, to onboard initial training, to just-in-time 
training, and all the way to performance support tools) will substantially increase training 
efficiency and effectiveness. Determining the proper methodologies to support such distribution 
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will mitigate further risk posed by current practices. Assuring these benefits of new training 
approaches requires research. 
Although training issues are covered in crew debriefs, systematic data on effectiveness of 
training are not collected or analyzed2. Thus, performance in spaceflight is not specifically 
assessed to validate current training practices. Skill-based training approaches have not been 
researched, and schedules for refresher training are not established; adaptive training 
technologies and delivery systems for onboard training have not been developed. Moreover, 
optimal strategies for training problem solving and decision making in space operations have not 
been studied. However, studies done by the HRP Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH) 
Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Training Task to support the development of Flight 
Controller training in problem solving and decision making demonstrate significant promise (see, 
e.g., Schmidt, et al. 2011). 
Task-based training does not necessarily lead to the development of generalizable skills (see, 
e.g., Healy and Bourne, 1995). Thus, training that is based on specific tasks might fail 
crewmembers faced with unexpected new emerging tasks. Because not all tasks on a long-
duration mission can be anticipated, training should focus instead on generalizable skills. 
Although we know that this needs to be done, we don’t yet know how to do it. Research is 
required to develop appropriate generalizable skill-based training. 
A further complication arises as a result of the novel technologies and operational scenarios that 
will exist for deep-space missions. Extensive automated and robotic systems may be used to 
assist crew in their work. Given that these technologies are still emerging, it is likely that 
modeling and simulation platforms that can be leveraged for training on such systems will be 
limited or lacking. Even well-designed systems that address the right problem can produce 
accidents if humans do not understand what the automation/robot is doing or how control is 
distributed between human and automation/robot. Even experienced, skilled, and motivated users 
might make an error if training does not provide a complete and accurate model of the 
automation and human-automation integration, or if direct "hands-on" training with the system 
(or a simulation of the system) is not available. Training must align the user’s mental model of 
the automated or robotic operations with how the automation/robot is designed to function (see, 
e.g., Billings, 1997). This includes teaching specific procedures, instilling in trainees an 
                                                     
 
 
2 Furthermore, crew performance during training is not always measured objectively, and training 
records are extremely limited.  So assessing training effectiveness is a serious challenge. 
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understanding of the environment and work to be done, and communicating a deep functional 
understanding of the automated systems. Training should also include information about how 
control is distributed between user and automation, how the user may change control, what other 
factors influence control state, and how to determine the current state of control. Some 
applications may require training for supervisors of automation or robotic behavior, not just 
operators. 
Clearly, more research is necessary to disentangle the various relevant issues so that specific 
training recommendations can be used to guide organizational training programs. 
Contributing Factor 2: Matching Between Task and Learning and Memory Abilities  
Matching between task and learning and memory is a factor when the individual’s relative 
efficiency with which new information is acquired and relatively permanent adjustments made in 
behavior or thinking, are not consistent with mission demands. Task design is often driven by the 
constraints of the technology involved. When the constraints of the human operator and those of 
the operational environment are not taken fully into account, problems arise. Furthermore, when 
training is designed strictly to meet performance criteria at the end of training, long-term 
retention is compromised (Healy and Bourne, 1995). Thus, when training is focused on a task 
that is technologically driven and is only aimed to “pass the class,” trainees’ ability to perform 
adequately following a long retention interval is greatly reduced increasing the risk of error and 
of compromising mission objectives. 
Research has shown that training aimed at long-term retention often results in high specificity, 
and thus low generalizability (e.g., Vogel and Thompson, 1995). Specificity might be desired 
when all tasks are well known and understood in advance; that, however, cannot be the case for 
future long-duration space missions. If anything, we know that our crews will face situations and 
tasks we do not currently have the tools or the ability to foresee. As a result, future training 
should focus on generalizability of skills, rather than specificity. Current research has made 
important, albeit small, steps towards understanding generalizability, but we are still far from 
having a clear methodology for effective training of generalizable skills (e.g., Healy and Bourne, 
2012). 
One small example of the issues associated with this contributing factor has to do with the 
differences in the cognitive mechanisms underlying recognition and recall. The difference 
between recognition and recall was identified in the early days of psychological research (e.g., 
MacDougal, 1904); studies have shown that it is much easier to recognize than to recall. As 
MacDougal (1904) describes: “the name which cannot, by the greatest racking of memory, be 
brought back to consciousness is thus uttered spontaneously and without hesitation when the 
bearer is again met face to face” (p. 229). Similarly, when a task involves the manipulation of an 
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interface and contains a sequence of several steps, an operator can master that sequence through 
practice during training, by recognizing the correct buttons to push or switches to set. However, 
following a retention interval of disuse, as would be expected with many tasks during a long-
duration space mission, the operator now has to recall those steps in the correct sequence, and no 
longer has the advantage of simply recognizing them. The memory structures constructed during 
training are thus critical to performance. Such memory structures can be very fragile and 
vulnerable to forgetting (see, e.g., Barshi & Loukopoulos, 2012; Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & 
Barshi, 2009a), even when the operator is an expert performer with extensive experience in the 
domain (see, e.g., Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007). Hence, training that isn’t sensitive 
to the potential mismatch between task demands and the operator’s learning and memory 
constraints can lead to increases in the risk of error and of compromising mission objectives. 
Computer-Based Modeling and Simulation 
Understanding and predicting human-system performance and identifying risks that may be 
inherent in a concept or a design is often achieved via computer-based modeling or simulation. 
The use of human performance models can result in significant lifecycle cost savings as 
compared to repeated human-in-the-loop evaluations, but accurately modeling the human is 
extremely difficult. In the SHFE domain, modeling and human-in-the-loop evaluations must be 
used in concert. We do not have high-fidelity human performance models, and most of those 
existing models have not been sufficiently validated or certified. Accordingly, models must be 
used in a limited fashion – i.e., to help determine the critical areas that should be addressed 
through the more costly, but more representative human-in-the-loop evaluations. As mentioned 
above, modeling and simulation platforms can be leveraged for training on emerging 
technologies that are still in development. 
Risk in Context of Exploration Mission Operational Scenarios 
Future exploration-mission scenarios will increase in duration and in distance from earth. This 
will require developing new technology, new work methods, and new ways of ensuring that 
these novel elements are suitably integrated. This absolutely includes the development and 
application of proper training methodologies both on the ground in preparation for missions and 
while in space. Missions carried out in space will need greater flexibility and less dependence on 
ground support, and new interaction between ground-based resources and crew will also be 
needed and require increased pre-flight and onboard training. Risks from inadequate design of 
human-technology interaction will increase as mission requirements become more demanding 
and as missions are carried out in unfamiliar circumstances substantially different from our 
experience base. Human factors principles will need to be extended and applied to reduce risk. 
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Gaps  
Potential gaps related to training include, but are not limited to: 
x Lack of modeling and simulation platforms that can be leveraged for training on 
emerging technology and systems 
x Inadequate or unavailable training programs 
x Inconsistencies with training, individual attributes and mission demands 
Training gaps will need to be coordinated with current and emergent gaps in other SHFE projects 
(e.g., Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration and Risk of 
Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction) and HRP elements (e.g., Behavioral Health and 
Performance’s Risk of Performance Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, 
Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team and Exploration Medicine and 
Exploration Medical Capability). As NASA migrates toward longer duration missions beyond 
low-earth orbit, challenges associated with communication latencies and skill degradation will 
require cross-disciplinary solutions. 
A summary of all SHFE gaps can be found in the Human Research Roadmap Content 
Management System at http://sa.jsc.nasa.gov/hrrcms/. 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this chapter describes issues related to the risk of performance errors 
due to training deficiencies. Contributing factors regarding training deficiencies may pertain to 
organizational process and training programs for spaceflight, such as when training programs are 
inadequate or unavailable. Furthermore, matching between task and learning and memory 
abilities is a contributing factor when the individual’s relative efficiency with which new 
information is acquired, and relatively permanent adjustments made in behavior or thinking, are 
inconsistent with mission demands. Thus, if training deficiencies are present, the likelihood of 
errors or of the inability to successfully complete a task increases. What’s more, the overall risk 
to the crew, the vehicle, and the mission increases. 
Substantial evidence supports the claim that inadequate training leads to performance errors. 
Barshi and Loukopoulos (2012) demonstrate that even a task as carefully developed and refined 
over many years as operating an aircraft can be significantly improved by a systematic analysis, 
followed by improved procedures and improved training (see also Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & 
Barshi, 2009a). Unfortunately, such a systematic analysis of training needs rarely occurs during 
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the preliminary design phase, when modifications are most feasible. Although operational tasks 
are executed in mockups and simulators by spaceflight crews during preflight training, and 
feedback regarding interfaces, tasks, and operations is received, often hardware, system and 
software designs are relatively mature. Therefore, it is often cost prohibitive to modify design 
based on feedback from training. Hence, designers must consider training when designing 
hardware and software with crew interfaces, procedures, and operations. Unfortunately, training 
is often seen as a way to compensate for deficiencies in task and system design, which in turn 
increases the training load. As a result, task performance often suffers, and with it, the operators 
and the mission. On the other hand, effective training can indeed compensate for such design 
deficiencies, and can even go beyond to compensate for our lack of knowledge or for failures of 
our imagination to anticipate all that might be needed when we send our crew members to go 
where no one else has gone before. Thus, incorporating training considerations in system design 
and designing effective training can go a long way towards mitigating mission risks. 
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